Paper Session III-C - Evaluating Strategies for Transfer of Government Space Technology by Handberg, Roger
The Space Congress® Proceedings 1996 (33rd) America's Space Program -What's Ahead? 
Apr 25th, 1:00 PM - 4:00 PM 
Paper Session III-C - Evaluating Strategies for Transfer of 
Government Space Technology 
Roger Handberg 
Center for Space Policy and Law, University of Central Florida 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Handberg, Roger, "Paper Session III-C - Evaluating Strategies for Transfer of Government Space 
Technology" (1996). The Space Congress® Proceedings. 22. 
https://commons.erau.edu/space-congress-proceedings/proceedings-1996-33rd/april-25-1996/22 
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Conferences at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in The Space Congress® 
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact 
commons@erau.edu. 
Evaluating Strategies For Transfer of Government Space Technology
Roger Handberg
Center for Space Policy and Law
University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida 32816
INTRODUCTION
Transferring space technology from the public sector to the
private has been the hallmark of American space policy since its
earliest inception. This pattern reflected early launch
technology and an already existing structure for private-public
cooperation as embodied in the NACA, predecessor of NASA.
Dramatic changes are occurring in the space industry environment,
transfer of government space technology becomes an even more
critical issue. This paper briefly examines several methods by
which such technology is transferred from the public sector to
the private. One must note that a reverse process also occurs,
private to public. Attention will be upon privatization as a
transfer strategy since it is politically very attractive but we
will also discuss briefly direct transfer, developmental
assistance, and spinoffs (indirect technology transfer) .
CHANGING POLICY ENVIRONMENT
Since the early space age, technology transfer has been
essential for developing an independent private space sector.
Space technology was derived from military oriented systems for
several reasons. First, national security related motivations
justified the large expenditures necessary before space
technology achieved success. The harshness of the flight
environment and the high capital investment, flight failures
being common - created an expense level unacceptable commercially
given the initial paucity of demonstrated marketable products.
Visions of the future do not pay the bills, bridging the gap
became the goal. Evidence of that eventual success exists in the
current ELV fleet where the workhorse vehicles including the
Atlas, Titan, and Delta are derivatives from earlier missile
programs. Newer launch technologies are coming on line but build
upon the earlier flight experience. Second, government programs
both military and civilian, had the capability early on to assume
the risks necessary to push the envelope. Costs were not
inconsequential but were defined politically in terms of national
security goals compared to the constraints of making a profit to
justify continuation. Remote sensing and communications
satellite development, for example, benefited from that greater
flexibility. This developmental system benefited a space
industry still seeking markets sufficient to justify their
efforts. Unfortunately, the underpinnings of that public
development process have drastically altered.
In recent years, the fiscal climate has chilled noticeably
for government funded space activities, both military and
civilian. Conversely, the private sector building upon those
earlier efforts and technologies appears, especially in remote
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sensing, communications, and global positioning-derived space
systems, to be moving into a more positive economic environment.
Those private activities, however, still benefit from technology
transfer although in some instances the flow may be reversed,
from private to public (i.e., NASA and DOD purchases of off the
shelf space technology when appropriate) . Regardless, strong
pressures press upon the public sector to proactively engage in
technology transfer activities. Those activities, however, carry
both benefits and costs, making assessment difficult as to which
is the most useful. There is another urgency concerning
technology transfer that is often implicit rather than overt. As
fiscal reductions threaten the survival of various programs and
agencies, there is a growing sense that a wider audience becomes
necessary else the technology or the methodology be lost in the
wreckage of discarded initiatives. The Clementine mission
emerged from a downsized BMDO with interesting implications for
space applications but clearly if downsizing had not occurred the
technology would likely have remained inhouse for the exclusive
benefit of its parent organization.
Transferring technology between the private and public
sectors sounds simple in theory but often proves difficult to
execute successfully in practice. NASA has engaged in different
initiatives aimed technology transfer but even the DOD has become
much more proactive as its budgets decline (Scott, May 16, 1994) .
The issue is often whether the technology itself is directly
transferred or is the knowledge which can be applied in
commercially relevant contexts what is transferred. In effect,
do you transfer the hardware or process or the knowledge. There
is no clear answer but here we will briefly evaluate several
strategies based on a review of earlier technology transfer
efforts.
PRIVATIZATION
This method of technology transfer is the most visible and
currently politically attractive. A government activity is
transferred from the public sector to the private with the
expectation that the new location will enhance organizational
flexibility leading to cost reductions despite the profit
expectation. For the public manager, there are two major virtues
for privatization: reduction or elimination of that portion of
their budget committed to a particular function and a concomitant
reduction in the span of activities for which they are held
accountable. Responsibility is transferred to the private
entity. The most immediately politically pleasimg advantage is
cost . Expenditures are reduced by removing the program or
activity from the agency’s budget. The actual budget reduction
achieved may be less than originally envisioned due to subsidy
provisions during the transition period or guarantees of future
income in order to entice private assumption of the program.
Privatization in principle means total removal from the public
budget, the reality proves much stickier and slower. As a
result, privatization often takes more complex forms than one
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Figure 1 provides a two-track schematic overview for the
degree of separation involved during various privatization
arrangements. Track A reflects the degree of public control or
involvement while Track B reflects the proportion of government
financial support or contribution made to the program. Point A
represents a normal government program with point D at the
opposite end being the optimal privatization plan when the
program becomes totally private and financially responsible for
all its actions. The in-between is why the process is depicted
as a double-tracked system since the two variables intertwine but
in fact represent separate dimensions of a single problem.
Track A references the degree of government control
maintained over the privatized entity ranging from total public
control to none at all. Between the two poles, one finds
differing degrees of publicly imposed restrictions on the
organization’s operating policies and programs. For example, at
point B, one finds fairly explicit and detailed requirements for
continuation of certain basic services and defined levels of
those services. This process can be observed in the ongoing
discussions over the Shuttle contract with the U.S. Space
Alliance to insure safety and reliability. By point C, the
restrictions are reduced in their explicitness and intensity,
allowing greater flexibility within the basic parameter that the
central tasks must be accomplished (for example, continuation of
Shuttle flights if the program is privatized). One should note
that privatization does not entail creating a public corporation
as opposed to a public agency. Such a corporation still remains
a public entity rather than a private one with the flexibility
that implies. The private sector includes the opportunity for
entrepreneurs to profit but also in principle to fail. That
failure possibility unnerves public proponents when they define
certain functions as critical; e.g. shuttle flights during space
station construction.
Track B references financing in that one moves from
traditional total government funding to a situation involving
wholly private financing through sale of services, the ultimate
goal. Point B identifies government-guaranteed funding or profit
(two distinct approaches) as the interaction mode --- the
government’s support becomes insurance against failure, although
real success remains difficult to achieve because public funding
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usually continues restrictions on operating style or decisions.
This is where the two tracks intersect most strongly, paying
equates to control. Point C represents a decreasing subsidy as
the government, over some defined time span, reduces its fiscal
support. This weaning process is often sought by businesses due
to market uncertainties and as an inducement for nervous
investors. One can imagine other possible interaction
combinations, this only presents a bare-bones conceptual
structure.
Ideologically, privatization proposals appeal because
American historical traditions advocate minimal government
intervention in the economy and society. That tradition is often
breached in practice but the intent remains strong. Space has
long been the almost exclusive venue of government --- a
situation that changes albeit slowly. One vehicle proposed for
speeding that change has been privatization but it has proven a
rickety bicycle upon which to journey into the future.
Government space programs have a particularly strong
attraction as possible privatization venues because of their high
and continuing (and to presidential administrations, unending)
costs . Things are always breaking. This political proclivity
is buttressed by the elaborate rationales expressed over the
years regarding the economic and technological development
potential embodied in a national space program. Those skills
rebound back to further American productivity in other areas of
the economy not just space-related industries. Such broader
technological and industrial returns, for example, lie at the
heart of ESA’S justification (Handberg and Johnson-Freese, 1994) .
Space-related privatization in principle facilitates that
transfer of skills and technology back to the private sector.
Remember almost by definition, privatized technology is not
classified although its dissemination may be limited due to
competitive concerns.
Unfortunately, the process has been rockier than one might
expect in principle. The difficulty lies in the fact that the
technology is government funded which creates several dynamics.
These can summarized in four clusters of concerns: the high cost
of operation, the convertibility issue, continued dependency on
government, and consumer resistance to change. The discussion
reflects a review of privatization efforts dating back to the
seventies and more recent proposals regarding the Space Shuttle
(Handberg, 1995).
The cost of operation and convertibility problems represent
different sides of the same coin. Both reflect the fact that
government space programs deemed suitable for serious
privatization consideration began as prototype noncommercial
efforts. The government routinely engages in demonstration
projects rather than implementing operational systems suitable
for immediate commercial operation. This model comes directly
from NACA and continues in NASA. Such projects prove extremely
useful in demonstrating the feasibility of particular space
applications but in and of themselves are unlikely to be
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commercially viable. Many are two stage affairs, demonstration
then development if the first is successful. For example, NASP-
derived vehicles were to follow on completion of the X-30
project. The temptation, however, becomes to switch over the
program in order not to “waste” the often large investment
already made. The problem is that the underlying goals driving
the original project make it incompatible for this different
purpose. The why is both fairly direct and simple.
When NASA develops a specific piece of hardware such as
Landsat it approaches the problem from a perspective not directly
concerned with costs especially the expenses of routine
operation. The system habitually has several characteristics:
being overly sophisticated relative to the task at hand, very
intense and demanding maintenance requirements, and virtually
hand-tooled uniqueness. Overly sophisticated comes from the fact
the engineer defines the task as research and development with
little concern for operating efficiency. Therefore, the system
reflects the experimental state of the art, which can mean
significant delays and shortfalls when the new technology
initially falls short. For the innovators, such delays and their
concomitant expenses are not trivial but, practically speaking,
are unimportant given their pursuit of the goal of technological
excellence. Clementine supporters argue that demonstration
technology is what the government should focus on, as it is best
equipped for the task not being profit driven.
Conceptual designs are typically more difficult to build
than the originators realize or care since their goal is
stretching the envelope. Successful commercial projects normally
operate just inside the cutting edge of technology where the
operating devices are tested and reasonably reliable.
Reliability is essential for successful commercial ventures,
which must provide their customers the promised product on time
and in usable form. Haphazard, erratic, and late delivery is a
surefire recipe for economic failure. The bottom line is that
merely rolling over an operating space applications demonstration
program means transferring its inefficiencies and peculiarities
wholesale into the commercial venture. A more productive
strategy takes the results of the demonstration project and
builds a new more standardized and flexible system.
Due to the preceding factors related to system costs, the
interim solution often chosen has been to continue the program’s
dependency on the government. This dependency takes several
forms, the most prominent involve direct economic support and
technology replacement strategies. Both involve defraying the
costs of doing business, although the objective is approached
from different angles. Cost reduction is achieved by directly
transferring expenses to the public sector rather than actual
elimination through achieving more efficient and effective
technologies. The latter remains the long-term goal but in the
short-term is a hybrid, whose survival is dependent upon
government favors.
The direct economic support component usually is packaged as
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direct subsidies and/or insured markets. In the former, the
government provides moneys directly to the business --- funding
that allows a profit for this otherwise unprofitable enterprise.
Such subsidies are explicitly employed in order to maintain
artificially low prices for consumers. Another mechanism for
providing subsidies but with the transparent fig leaf of
appearing indirect is by insuring a guaranteed market. For
example, prospective entrepreneurs taking over the Landsat and
abortively the weather satellites were guaranteed sales of their
satellites’ output by several government agencies. There was no
concern with fostering competition or getting the best value
since the purpose was to provide funding for privatization albeit
disguised as sales income. Sales organizations often employ a
draw against future earnings for new personnel but with payback.
Space privatization proposals never envision such a situation,
emphasizing to the public the irrelevance of what they sell. The
other major mechanism involves the government agreeing to provide
the enterprise with the follow-on replacement technology
necessary to sustain the business. This strategy was employed in
the Landsat situation with mixed results. Space-related
technologies are expensive to develop with a proclivity for
failures, e.g. the failed launch of Landsat 6. The entrepreneur
here is de facto exempted from enduring the risks and
uncertainties inherent in that developmental process. Although
that often proves untrue in practice.
The downside of either strategy becomes clear when one
glances over the historical record. Direct subsidies are public
grants which are subject to the vagaries of the political
process. As key agency and political personnel, who made the
original agreement, turn over, the institutional sense of
commitment becomes attenuated, meaning that reduction and
ultimate cancellation of the subsidy becomes very probable.
Successor decision makers, searching for surplus funds to handle
new and more pressing problems, find such pots of money
attractive to tap. Therefore, commitments are not met and the
company is cut adrift or else a continued series of crises occur.
Finally, public subsidies cut several ways, a fact often
forgotten when privatization scenarios are constructed. The
subsidized also include the consumers of the services or
products, not just the business. Instead of a front-end subsidy,
the impact is at the other end of the process. The project began
as a demonstration of usefulness; therefore, consumer costs are
kept low to entice participation. Resistance to price changes by
consumers has been strong. Two arguments are used: one is that
the public has already paid, why should they pay twice? And if
the prices are raised, they are unable to afford them. Appeals
against price increases are to Congress not the company since the
members will respond to strong constituent demands. Economic
rationality becomes a perpherial concern.
DIRECT TRANSFER
Direct transfer means the unrestricted release of public
technology to the private sector for their use. Three
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difficulties have plagued this approach: (1) a dissemination
problem, (2) a compatibility problem, and (3) a marketing
problem. The first merely refers to the fact that the private
sector may be unaware of the available public technology and its
commercial potential (Scott, May 16, 1994) . Available
information may be opaque to those not engaged in the field.
More critically, investigation of a possible technology may be
hampered by the firm’s lack of expertise. Their expertise base
is sufficient for their immediate purposes but not the new
possibility. Larger corporations are often indifferent to
technologies they are not already engaged in working on. NASA
has engaged in several outreach efforts aimed at making potential
recipients aware of the possibilities.
Second, the transferred technology may require significant
investment before establishing its commercial usefulness. Given
marketplace uncertainties and other priorities, the technology
will likely be ignored. Management horizons are not always
sufficiently long to justify such a heavy commitment. Subsidy
programs to assist the transfer can be too unfocused to be
effective. Many firms work on the technology only as long as
there is a contract, dropping it once the contract ends.
Defense reconversion has opened up many new potential
products but the vendors are unfamiliar and uncomfortable with
marketing such products (Anselmo, February 28, 1994) . Their
marketing experience is confined to a defined government
marketplace, the open market is hostile and strange plus demands
a different set of organizational reflexes. Applying their
technologies requires an ability to adjust rapidly to changing
consumer demands, a demand often created by the technology.
Companies with excellent products can fail due to marketing
errors. The continuing drama of Apple Computer reflects this
reality. Moving from government space to civilian markets
requires creation of a new marketing presence. Government
programs can and do assist in the dissemination and compatibility
issues but the latter remains strictly the private sector’s
problem.
DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE
Developmental assistance has been the strongest focus for
the technology transfer effort. Several programs have operated
to assist private and nonprofit organizations fully develop
various aspects of space technology. For NASA, the intent has
been two fold: creation of a larger user population and
establishment of the usefulness of space applications in new
areas of activity. Probably the most visible and troubled of
those efforts are NASA’s Centers for the Commercial Development
of Space (CCDS) . Set up in conjunction with university
researchers and the private sector, the CCDS have a checkered
history in large measure because the proposed projects are not
always deemed truly commercial in intent. University researchers
like NASA itself are often more focused on the technical advances
possible rather than the commercial aspects. The most public
CCDS sponsored project has been the Wake Shield Facility which
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flies on the Shuttle with mixed success. The program envisions
manufacturing ultra pure computer chips using the vacuum of
space. The difficulty is that the cost remains high compared to
earth-based production processes. The performance improvement,
therefore, may not be economically justified. In late 1994, a
number of the CCDS were cancelled due to performance failures.
A more successful effort has been the Earth Observations
Commercialization Applications Program (EOCAP) which promotes
commercial remote sensing (Macauley, 1995) . The projects here
have been deemed more successful because industry involvement has
been more extensive and involved provision of real funding by the
companies. Therefore, projects are more focused on profit
potential from the beginning. NASA is placed in a more
supportive role. An unstated aspect is that remote sensing as an
economic enterprise has become more robust as national security
restrictions on the field are reduced and the growth in concern
with environmental monitoring.
SPINOFFS
Spinoffs refers simply that technologies are developed for
public purposes for which entrepreneurs develop other
applications; thus, creating a commercial market where none was
necessarily envisioned. This technology transfer process is
indirect in that the implications are not clear to the original
developers. The best example currently is the application of
Global Positioning System technology in a variety of commercial
modes. The original space system was envisioned as an aid to
military operations and search and rescue situations. Presently,
there are a multitude of applications with more arising each day.
For example, the grading of property for development is being
made more accurate through such technology. Spinoffs can go both
ways, the historic example is the development of the canning
industry which had obviously military applications in allowing
the storage of food for long periods in sustaining military
operations. The strength of this method is the fact that the
technology is employed by those who see a need, their decisions
being fiscally based from the beginning. Government's role is
minimal here except to make the technology accessible. This is
likely to grow as defense conversion continues and companies
become more sensitive to market considerations.
CONCLUSION
Technology transfer remains a difficult process because it
involves predicting the future path of technological change.
That means missteps occur routinely but learning from mistakes
should strength the process. Privatization is a seductively
attractive option but one whose pathway proves more complicated
than proponents are aware or acknowledge. The other options are
ones that have proven more productive over the long term.
REFERENCES
Anselmo, Joseph C. February 28, 1994. “Nondefense Products
Bring Mixed Results to Aerospace," Aviation Week & Space
Technologv , 63-4.
Handberg, Roger. 1995. The Future of the Space Industry.
9-41
Westport: Quorum Books.
Handberg, Roger and Joan Johnson-Freese. 1994. The Prestige
Trap: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S., European and
Japanese Space Programs. Dubuque: Kendall-Hunt.
Macauley, Molly K. 1995. “NASA’S Earth Observations
Commercialization Applications Program: A Model for
Government Promotion of Commercial Space Opportunities,"
Space Policy 11: 53-65.
Scott, William B. May 16, 1994. “NASA Reshapes Tech Transfer,”
Aviation Week & Space Technoloqv , 55.
9-42
